For the past two months, the bloodiest phase of Syria’s civil war, government troops and rebel forces have been fighting for the city of Aleppo. It’s a question of critical turf: Aleppo is Syria’s largest and wealthiest city, the beating heart of the country’s economy and industry, and now it’s up for grabs. For the regime, losing Aleppo is the equivalent of losing New York.
But there are other reasons why what happens in Aleppo – the day-to-day street battles – can shape the course of the conflict. Here’s our breakdown around why.
Why does Aleppo matter?
Among other reasons, it matters because if the rebels can control Aleppo then they gain a critical chunk of territory in Northern Syria. That would conceivably create space for an alternative government inside of Syria. The rebels, a loose group of fighters collectively known as the Free Syrian Army, already control border posts at the nearby frontier with Turkey. They use them to bring in weapons and people, fly the rebel flag, and stamp passports. They consider it liberated territory, and winning Aleppo would boost it significantly.
On the regime side, the battle matters because for a year and a half of revolution, Assad relied on the stability of Aleppo and Damascus – Syria’s most important cities. They had remained relatively quiet, with some protests and battles along the way. That meant Assad could point to those cities and tell his base, ‘look, we still have a third of the country on our side.’
With Aleppo’s battle raging it changes the narrative of the struggle and moves the regime closer to a tipping point. Syria’s business class, capitalists who were sitting on the fence or still hoping for a return to stability, now have to change their calculations. Their companies and factories are dormant or destroyed. There’s no way to ignore it.
On the regional front, the Battle of Aleppo has meant a swelling refugee crisis. That puts more pressure on the world to act. In particular, it puts pressure on Turkey to become the tip of the spear in any intervention against the Assad regime.
What’s the state of play?
For now, it’s a bloody stalemate. The rebels don’t have enough weapons to dislodge the regime. The regime, even with its superior force, hasn’t been able to root out the rebels. The main frontline is in the southwest of Aleppo, in a neighborhood called Salah el Din, but battles break out new fronts are opened almost every day. There are skirmishes in many parts of the city, with government and rebel forces trading territory in fierce street battles with no clear victor in the larger war for the city.
As that dynamic churns on, attacks on civilian areas have spiked, with devastating loss of life. The biggest threats are the constant shelling, the regime’s aerial attacks, and what activists have described as barrel bombs, containers filled with oil and explosives. They’ve reportedly been dropped on civilian neighborhoods that lay behind rebel lines.
What does it say about what the Assad regime can and can’t do?
The Battle of Aleppo shows the inability of the regime to control its own territory. It can’t dislodge rebels from neighborhoods where they have popular support.
But it also shows the weaknesses of the rebels: they don’t have the weapons they need, their internal squabbles have made them less effective, and their excesses in war have led to severe human rights abuses. Rebels have been blamed for torture and executions, as well as looting and squatting in people’s homes. Because of those abuses, people now talk of the revolution losing its soul.
What is life like in Aleppo right now?
Horrible. In rebel areas, locals tell us there’s a shortage of food, no water, no electricity. The shelling is intense. Many people are leaving, others are too poor to go; they don’t have the estimated $200 for a taxi ride out of the city. And they aren’t sure they can make it to safety in a Turkish refugee camp; at times, Turkey has restricted the inflow of Syrian refugees, leaving thousands stranded at the border.
Conditions are a bit easier in regime-controlled areas, because there’s no shelling or airstrikes. Some people are still going out to restaurants, trying to have a normal life. But that space is getting smaller.
Why is the regime killing so many civilians?
It’s impossible to say exactly what Assad is thinking in targeting civilians, but analysts describe it as a strategy of negative incentives: creating a situation where the presence of rebel fighters puts civilian lives at risk. In principle, that creates pressure for the rebels to give up their terrain in order to save civilian lives. It’s also punishment to those areas hosting rebel fighters.
Whatever the reason, the result has been brazen and bloody episodes. Especially salient: the government attacks on break lines, such as the August 16 bombing of the Bab al Hadid bakery, which killed dozens of people.
For more in one great watch on the web, check out the PBS Frontline documentary from Aleppo, on The Battle for Syria.
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Comments
Great read! Will share with friends.
This article provides a good background about the battle for Aleppo. Like the article about Kurds, I also think it’s a must-read for anyone reading about the Syrian revolution. To me, the battle for Aleppo is the most significant battle overall. A lot is at stake and, in my view, if Assad loses Aleppo, he will lose the war. Aleppo is, if I remember correctly, the largest city in Syria and the economic heart of the country. Thus, if the regime loses Aleppo, it will be a huge blow both militarily and psychologically (in my view it would lead to more division in the regime’s inner circle). I agree with the article that capturing the city of Aleppo would give the opposition more control of northern Syria (and a major city) and its capture would be a huge morale boost.
I agree that Aleppo has been very quiet. I think the reason why it has remained so quiet and why it seemed “pro-regime” for so long is because many elites were benefiting from the regime’s policies and thus were unwilling to rise against the regime (and Aleppo had many elites). I’m not sure if the battle has changed their support for Assad, but many have left the city itself.
I also agree that the battle has become a vicious stalemate. The regime’s tactics have been incredibly horrific. I’ve seen videos of neighborhoods after bombings and the aftermath of attacks overall. It’s bloody and horrendous. Unfortunately, as the article points out, this stalemate will continue. Neither side, as the article points out, has been able to gain an advantage. It’s urban warfare. However, the regime has a huge advantage (as the article points out) in both heavy weaponry and aerial bombings (opposition has no jets and few anti-aircraft weapons). The FSA is able to hold out though because- in my opinion- it could use IEDs and other bombs to stop regime tanks (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/19/world/middleeast/syrian-rebels-hone-bomb-skills-military-analysis.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0) and (from what I heard) conventional forces-like the regime’s forces- aren’t trained for urban warfare. Nonetheless, there is a heavy human cost- especially with the regime’s brutal tactics.
As for what is causing some in Aleppo to not support the FSA, I would say there are multiple factors. I do agree that some FSA have committed abuses (though in my view the regime’s abuses are much more widespread, extensive, and worse overall). Also, there are some foreign fighters and extremists who have come to fight and hijack the revolution (though they make up a small % of opposition overall- http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/assads-self-fulfilling-prophecy). These factors, along with the heavy human cost and some existing support for Assad (or fears generated by Assad’s sectarian efforts and failure of some opposition groups (like the SNC) to reach out to address concerns of minority groups) have caused some in Aleppo to oppose the FSA. Thus, I do agree with the article that the regime’s strategy of inflicting suffering (along with the other aforementioned factors) is a contributor to the anger that some feel against the FSA.
This suffering will continue though. In my view, the other reason for the regime launching such heinous assaults is that it wants to destroy areas that it has lost and punish the people overall (collective punishment). It has already done so in other places like the countryside- FSA-held areas are bombed daily by regime artillery and planes and these are areas that the regime has mostly been unable to recapture. Aleppo is no different. It’s being bombed each day. As long as the international community continues to refuse to provide heavy weaponry to the FSA, this bloody stalemate and the horrendous attacks will continue. I understand that there are concerns that such heavy weapons will end up in the hands of extremists. Still, such fears are being used as excuses for passivity. Yes, there are concerns about extremists getting weapons (though such extremists, as I mentioned before, do not make up the majority of the FSA). Nonetheless, the U.S. can mitigate this by ramping up its vetting of FSA groups. In fact, it should play a bigger role in arming the FSA (rather than remaining passive and delegating the task to others). Specifically, it should take control of the arming effort and ensure that arms flows are only going to moderate groups (and that these groups receive the heavy weaponry). Moreover, to hasten the end of the battle (and ensure Assad’s fall), U.S. special forces can organize, unify, and train the FSA to help them improve their capabilities.
PS. I forgot to mention that the Frontline documentary link is not working. Nonetheless, the web site design is really great. It’s very professional and well done. Keep it up.
I should mention that although I think regime’s crimes are much worse (and are more extensive), and though I do support FSA overall, I think that the FSA will have to work on some issues (like abuses by some FSA groups- FSA is made up of various groups in different cities). I remember some FSA brigades signed a pledge to respect human rights. That was a huge, great, and important step. The next step is to ensure that other brigades sign the pledge and ensure that it is implemented. The SNC and other opposition groups will have to reach out to minority groups as well and address their concerns. I think Assad’s sectarian efforts (like misleading efforts in painting FSA as a bunch of Islamic extremists) have only made concerns grow (along with the opposition groups’ inability to unite and address concerns of minority groups).