Dr. M. Zaher Sahloul

Every area is different in terms of the facilities available, and the supply shortages and types of injuries. In many urban areas like Aleppo, most of the physicians have fled, to Turkey and Jordan and other countries. There were about 2,000 doctors in Aleppo before the crisis, and that number is now down to 70. The area under opposition control, 50 percent of Aleppo, has 2 million civilians, 10 hospitals and only 70 practitioners.

They’re short of everything, from IV fluids to oral antibiotics to painkillers to anesthesia to surgical supplies, to electricity, phone lines, ambulances and diesel fuel to operate generators. Of course NGOs are trying to help them get the supplies, but you have to smuggle them across the Turkish border. Or sometimes you get it from other areas in Syria and transfer it to Aleppo. This operation is a logistical nightmare, especially if you want to transport things from Turkey or Jordan or Lebanon. Then there’s the concern [when the supplies have been donated] of, how do you document that it was used for the purpose it was sent for?

This 24-year-old escaped to better care via public sewer. / M. Zaher Sahloul

You have trained physicians dealing with things they’re not trained to deal with. Like an internist might be the only doctor in town, and now he has to deal with surgical cases and amputations and people bleeding to death. So you at least have to give him a crash course in how to deal with that. We’ve been doing crash courses for Syrian doctors, providing them with medical supplies.

There are all kinds of cases where lives could have been saved with simple things like blood donations, the right transport equipment, or if you have a surgeon who can deal with the injury. A lot of people lose their limbs because there’s no surgeon who can suture their muscles or no operating room to deal with a simple surgery that with time becomes very complicated. In medicine there’s a “golden hour” to treat certain injuries, especially with patients who are bleeding [heavily]. And if you miss it, patients end up losing legs, arms, lives, because of delays of treatment. Patients used to be transferred to Turkish hospitals, and it took a few hours. Now it takes five days.

A four-year-old patient now suffering from depression. / M. Zaher Sahloul

One patient I saw was a 24-year-old mother whose home was shelled in the old city of Homs, which is about seven hours’ drive from the Turkish border. When I saw her, she was in a rehabilitation unit in Antakya. She told me her home had been shelled, so she rushed out because there was a fire. Her left arm was hanging from her shoulder and bleeding profusely. She was taken to a primitive field hospital in the old city and they amputated her arm. She stayed there between life and death for 18 days because the old city was under siege [and she couldn't be moved elsewhere]. It still is.

Eventually they were able to smuggle her and her children out of the old city through an underground sewer system. Then it took five days to get to Turkey, and at that time she developed a huge infection in her body from her wound. She’s 24, but after this she looks like she’s in her 50s.

I also saw a 4-year-old child. Her house had been shelled in Idlib, and she had a spinal cord injury. She was moved to Turkey and had surgery but was not able to move her body. I tried to joke with her, to smile, I brought her a big stuffed bear. But she could not make a smile. She was very depressed, at four years old. And this is one of the thousands of patients you see.

Andrew Bowen / Rice University

Andrew Bowen: Egypt, outside of Dubai, has the largest amount of fleeing Syrian money. So there’s been that shift. From the very beginning Morsi tried to broker something with [Bashar al-Assad ally] Iran, but it fizzled. He was frustrated with that initiative – remember when he visited Tehran after the elections – and he assumed Iran was discussing a new relationship [between Iran and Egypt], he could bring up Syria, but the Iranians showed no interest.

Syria has been a concern of Morsi’s but wasn’t as big a focus [as his domestic problems]. He realizes that Egypt is in a pretty constrained position to play a regional role, with financial dependence on Qatar as a lifeline, so he’s followed what Qatar was doing. Quite frankly Qatar has more resources to devote to Syria than it does to Egypt. One concern Morsi had was, “You have a massive influx of [Syrian] people into Egypt – who takes care of them?” [The refugee situation] is impacting Egypt, but not in the degree it’s impacted Lebanon or Jordan.

In recent days, Muslim Brotherhood supporters called for support for jihad in Syria. That could be seen as the Muslim Brotherhood trying to reassert itself, in the past few months, into the chaos of the Syrian opposition. There are also tensions now between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Saudi has been pushing the more traditionalist elements [in Syria], while Qatar, who had been taking the lead role, was pushing the Muslim Brotherhood. This shift in balance towards Saudi now taking a larger leadership role in Syria, eclipsing Qatar, has clearly put the Muslim Brotherhood in a tight position. So Egypt is facing a more fiscally constrained environment, this ongoing competition between Saudi and Qatar on the role of the Muslim Brotherhood.

And Morsi announced that any Egyptians who went to fight in Syria would not be prosecuted when they returned. This is a sign that the Muslim Brotherhood wants to support their [Brotherhood] colleagues on the ground.

Syria Deeply: What’s the relationship like between Morsi and Assad?

AB: I don’t think Assad and Morsi ever really had a relationship. Egypt has always backed the Arab League stance [against Assad]. I don’t think there could ever have been a strong Muslim Brotherhood/Egypt relationship with an Assad regime.

SD: Does the timing of this pullback have anything to do with Barack Obama’s announcement that the U.S. will arm the Syrian rebels?

AB: I don’t know if it’s necessarily that the decision to arm was the trigger for this, or that even the use of chemical weapons factored in. It could be a coincidence or a buildup of events. I do think it makes it easier for anyone in the Egyptian military to go along with it if that’s what the U.S. is doing now.

SD: What will Morsi’s decision mean for the Assad regime?

AB: Egypt’s a small player in this, and it’s just more noise of opposition for the regime. Assad knows how weak Egypt is. If this was Egypt under [Hosni] Mubarak or [Anwar] Sadat, it may have been a different case. But the Muslim Brotherhood has been opposing Assad from early on, so it’s not like this is such a big shift. It’s not like this impacts him much at all.

We asked Elizabeth O’Bagy, Syria expert at the Institute for the Study of War, to weigh in.

Elizabeth O’Bagy / Institute for the Study of War

I think as far as recent announcements go, it looks like the U.S. has made  a big decision that’s opening new doors. I think a lot depends on what they can achieve with negotiations and work for a political solution.

Personally I don’t expect much to come out of it. Russia has been very clear about its stance, and it has humored the U.S. as much as it’s felt the need to. But it has done little more than that. Nowhere in the two years since the start of the war has Russia made any significant endeavor to work with the U.S. or cooperate with the U.S. If anything, it’s ben the inverse. In many cases, people have talked about the Russians openly throwing Syria in the face of the U.S. and really challenging us on this issue.

Both sides are posturing a bit. Some of the statements going back and forth are so similar to what I learned in high school about the Cold War. Each side accuses each other of trying to up the ante. You already have both sides saying that negotiations are less likely because of the other’s actions. They’re setting a framework [so that] when negotiations [between Assad and the opposition] do fail, they can say ‘see, this is [just] the failure of the negotiations.’ Both sides can play each other that way. The hope is that Russia has some sort of interest in preventing Syria from this inevitable downward spiral. They don’t want to see a chaotic switch in reason. The U.S. is hoping to use that as a starting point in which there could be cooperation.

The point of the meeting is that both Russia and the U.S. can discuss how they want to play the negotiations –  what positions they want to take and how much they’re willing to push and prod the various side — the U.S. pushing the opposition, Russia the regime. The best we could hope for is that both of them decide it’s in their better interest to prevent chaos and spillover and both countries really push the opposition and regime to come to some sort of negotiation. And for obvious reasons, it will be very difficult. The U.S. itself has very little influence with the opposition and I suspect Russia has less influence with the regime than they’re willing to admit. So in terms of what will be accomplished in these meetings, we’ll see statements to the effect that they have come to some sort of agreement, but whether that actually pans out into genuine action is unlikely.

What the U.S. is really pushing is for Russia to take a stance against Assad. But I just don’t see Russia being harsher towards the regime, and even if it is, they don’t have significant leverage over regime decisions. Where it becomes much more critical is if the U.S. is able to work with Iran and see what they might be able to maneuver with the help of Iran.

The team’s most visible project is a map that maps who (Free Syrian Army rebels or forces loyal to the Syrian regime) is in control in each province.

SNAP is just one of the data analysis and mapping organizations who mine ground-specific data from afar as Syria’s borders become less accessible. Syria Deeply spoke with Greg Vaughan, SNAP’s Beirut-based GIS (geographic information systems and digital mapping) specialist, about how the data is collected:

Greg Vaughan: We set it up to do secondary data analysis, so we don’t do primary data collection. We take it from secondary sources, a range from media reports to publications from the humanitarian community (which includes NGOs, donors, think tanks, rescue organizations, universities and of course all of the United Nations [country] reports). We bring that information together into our reports.

We also work with partner organizations to coordinate a database of geographical information. We put together a comprehensive database of the spatial characteristics of the country and try to pick out the major themes of what’s occurring.

Courtesy SNAP / ACAPS

The last time we published the map was in March. There will [likely be] another at the end of this month, part of the June regional analysis. The situation is changing fluidly on a daily basis, and this represents a snapshot in time. In pulling that map together, we used baseline geographical information for the administrative boundaries and for background information.

What we do to actually develop conflict data is take information from media sources who are reporting where conflict is occurring and who’s holding particular areas. We compile the information into a database. Then we do analysis. The intent of the map is only to show at a coarse, broad level which groups are said to be holding a particular area – no one has information at a specific, fine-grain level as to what’s happening on the ground all over the country.

There were huge challenges with putting together something like that and trying to find the neutrality of the information. This was one of the biggest caveats. There’s a lot of emotion, a lot of vested interest. With the information from social media, you need to be careful about different groups promoting different agendas. It’s for that reason we keep it very general and try not to be specific.

Look at the areas of control – in areas that don’t have a lot of conflict, you can still see who has control. We also try to triangulate reporting with conflict data sets produced by U.N. agencies and NGOs. That’s the general [vetting] process we go through.

Elif, 24, is a student of Discourse Studies in London. She left her studies and returned home to Istanbul for 10 days to support the Gezi Park resistance movement:

Karen Leigh / Syria Deeply

“There’s a huge rage since the Reyhanli bombings, which are mostly related to the exterior politics of Erdogan in Syria. We’ve received refugees, and this is fine with the public. But he also received guerrillas, and it’s said that he trained them – you can find the proof of that in the media. There is a difference between receiving refugees and training guerrillas. For me, it then becomes direct interference in Syria’s politics.So yeah, this is an accumulation of Reyhanli, as well as other stuff: ecological movements, the privatization of public resources, conservative actions, and many others.

I think Erdogan isn’t successful in any of those issues because he doesn’t behave transparently with his people. He denies that he trains guerrillas, doesn’t even mention it. And a couple of years ago he was not against Assad, but now he’s against him and blames him for being a tyrannical leader. I’m not really sure how our government can benefit by Assad leaving, but it might be related to the Sunni and Alevi sects of Islam – that a Sunni union is being sought within the Middle East. So maybe Syria is seen as an obstacle.

I do think that the media and ministers should be careful about not directing hatred towards Syrian refugees, because they’re people suffering from the war and no one can blame them. I think Turkey should receive them. But from another perspective, Turkey doesn’t receive economic support from other countries for their sheltering or feeding them, or for their medical needs. If everyone is keen on receiving the refugees, maybe international financial support could be handed to Turkey.

Umut, 28, is a riot policeman who came to Gezi Park while off duty to visit family members:

I think Erdogan should stop everything he does about Syria. He has to send away these immigrants, I think, the people running from Syria. We don’t want them here. I think they are traitors to their country.

I personally think that every country’s problem is their problem, not ours. They have to fix their problems personally, not with the influence of another country. We shouldn’t go there and do anything. As you know in Syria there is Sharia law, and I think it’s wrong. I want every country and every woman to be free, but it is not my problem, and I don’t talk about it or do anything. If something has to be done, it has to be done by the people of that country, and no one else should get involved.

Muhammed al-Mahmoud, 24, is an Arabic–Turkish interpreter from Aleppo who lives in Istanbul. He returns to Syria several times a month to deliver donated medicines from Syrian–American groups that support the revolution. He is an active member of the Syrian Democratic parliament, a coalition that is independent of both the Assad government and the Muslim Brotherhood:

[Erdogan] always tells lies about Syria. He arranged some border policies, but he always changes them. He has tried to take some areas from Syria, and I think Syrians are furious about it. They ask him, where is your red line? Your first one was in Hama, and the next one in Aleppo? And now where is your next one, in Ankara or in Istanbul?

Morgan Brinlee / Syria Deeply

He’s always saying that he’s with the opposition, but he’s just been giving food, medicine, this kind of stuff. And he told us that the borders are open for Syrians, but they’re not. I cross the borders all the time, every week or two, and I can see how many Syrians are waiting on the other side of the borders to come to Turkey. Sometimes they’re waiting six months.

Servet, 26, is a teaching student in Istanbul and is originally from a Kurdish village in the eastern part of Turkey. His right forearm is in a cast as he has a broken bone from a police tear gas canister fired during the first day of the protests:

Whatever Assad is doing to his people, Erdogan is also doing the same things in the [tumultuous, Kurdish] southeast region of Turkey to Kurdish people, so there is no difference between them. Erdogan is scared because here the Kurdish people are improving themselves. In Iran they’ve improved too – not like Turkey, but better than Syria. And Syrian Kurdish people are getting organized. So, with Kurdish people living in Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq, maybe he’s scared that they’re going to get together.

Ali, 33, is an engineer in Istanbul who grew up in a Kurdish village near Adiama, in southeastern Turkey:

Erdogan’s main target is to attack Syria. In the last meeting with Obama, he wanted to support Assad’s opposition with guns. But Obama doesn’t want to bring Assad down with guns, he just wants to do it with politics, by bureaucracy. And this mostly depends on Kurdish politics, because many Kurdish people live in the north of Syria, and Erdogan wants to control them. Assad supports the Kurds in Syria and tells them, “If you defend your lands in Syria you will be independent.” So Turkey worries about that, because in the north of Iraq they have an independent Kurdish republic, and if Syria had a Kurdish republic, it would be a big risk in Turkey, because all of these countries border Turkey.

Karen Leigh / Syria Deeply

There is, I think, too much information about Syria, about Assad. Because when there were spring revolutions in other states, you could see people do that. But I think the main problem is that the Muslim Brotherhood is much more violent than Assad. In the last video we had here, they killed people and ate their lungs. Such violence – how can you trust these people? Erdogan, everywhere he goes, says, “I support them,” and he wants the support of the U.N. to bring down Assad.

If Turkey really had democracy, then it could help other countries. But Turkey hasn’t got democracy. Because where are Alevi rights? Where are Kurdish rights?

Syria Deeply: What’s the current state of the opposition?

Rex Brynen: We’re still in a situation where the opposition suffers from some profound disconnects and fragmentation. You have to look at the political leadership that’s both in exile and abroad. They’re the interlocutors between the diplomatic community and what’s happening on the ground. There is absolutely no evidence that the disconnection has diminished and it’s actually grown worse.

Then there’s the fragmentation of opposition groups, particularly the armed opposition groups on the ground, where we’ve seen no success in improving military coordination. There are a few cases of successful coordination; in many ways the fact that Qusayr held out as long as it did [two and a half weeks] indicated that commanders had managed to put together battlefield coordination that was somewhat functional. And Jabhat al-Nusra has managed its internal coordination quite well. But we do not see an armed opposition that is capable of substantial operational cooperation, let alone strategy cooperation. And that, far more than the [needing Western] weapons issue, has been a primary shortcoming.

It’s striking to realize that the Syrian opposition is more fragmented than militias in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We’re setting a new standard for fragmentation where we are seeing hundreds and maybe thousands of [Syrian opposition] militias right now. There are two sets of issues. The first is the military imbalance, the inability to do things beyond local actions and to have a strategic plan. Secondly, there’s no branding of the opposition anymore on the ground. It’s hard to tell what the opposition stands for. For every group that attempts to behave itself, another behaves inappropriately and dynamics get driven by the lowest common denominator.

A striking example of this was the very well-publicized murder of a little kid in Aleppo [earlier this month by an unknown rebel group]. His dad was asked who did this and he said, “I don’t know, I can’t tell the militias apart.” So if people on the ground who have a particularly vested interest can’t tell who these guys are, you have an anarchistic environment. And apart from military inefficiencies, this makes it hard for the opposition to grow.

I think one implication of that, coupled with the rise of more military jihadist groups, is that the opposition can’t grow on the ground in Syria, leaving a lot of people on the fence or even actively supporting the regime. It’s hard to me to see that we’re in a better position than we were two years ago. At that point, there was an excuse for the lack of coordination – we were just starting out, it’s hard to form an opposition.

SD: Does the US announcement of arming the rebels just change the opposition’s states? Will it shift the balance on the ground?

RB: I don’t think [Obama's announcement] is a magic wand. We already had the arming of activists going on. There’s no particular reason to believe that the U.S. entering [the situation] changes what the Qataris and Jordanians have already been able to provide. I suspect the U.S. is already more than involved via Jordan’s supply of Croatian arms in southern Syria.

SD: Isn’t the U.S. already involved, under the table, with the opposition? A U.S. senator just went as far as to go in and meet with them.

RB: The U.S. could say it wasn’t technically arming rebels because it was arming the Jordanians. They facilitate the sale to the Jordanians, the Jordanians give it away [to the rebels] and the U.S. can claim it’s not involved. Does the provision of weapons give more force to the opposition now? In theory, it does. Indeed, it was quite striking, the arrival of Croatian arms [earlier this year] in southern Syria, provided by the Jordanians. The first images showed them all in the hands of FSA units, and a few weeks later you see them in the hands of people the Jordanians would not have given them to. The weapons get traded, stolen, sold. And I don’t think the provision of military resources from the outside has proved the slightest bit effective in providing coordination or unity.

SD: When do you think U.S. weapons will arrive in Syria? How will we know the rebels have received and are using them?

RB: I think this is going to be very subtle. The opposition runs out of ammunition a little less frequently than it did. They hold their ground in places a little bit better. Some of the Croatian weapons that were provided used ammunition only available in the former Yugoslavia, which has the advantage of when you stop providing the ammo, the weapons are useless. Is that a clever attempt to prevent heavier weapons from proliferating post-conflict?

I don’t see the dramatic new arrival of whole new weapons systems on the battlefield that have a game-changing effect. Wars aren’t suddenly won because one side got a new weapons system the other side didn’t have. What we have to recognize here is that it’s partly a warning to the Syrian [government] that if its sporadic chemical weapons use increases, the Americans will match that with their own actions. It’s part of a broader signaling that, yes, we will ratchet up our policy if you continue with the sporadic use.

SD: Who exactly gets the weapons?

RB: It’ll be the units that rhetorically align with FSA. Maybe some moderate Islamists too. Ammo is probably more important than actual guns. Manpads [shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles], absolutely not. I would be extraordinarily surprised if they provided anything that allowed rebels to shoot down military aircraft, because anything by that definition can shoot down, in a few years, a civilian aircraft. The only way I could see that happening is if they took special teams and trained them and gave them a Manpad. They are extremely dangerous in the wrong hands – one Manpad, one [Boeing] 747, 400 people.

SD: Will it make a difference on the battlefield?

RB: Anti-tank guided missiles would make some difference. Overall, all this stuff will improve the military capacities of the opposition, [but] we’ve seen that in the south, from Deraa all the way up to Damascus, there’s been no real erosion of the regime position.

SD: What do you expect to see in the coming month of global diplomacy?

RB: We see a lot of maneuvering around the Geneva conference. It fails to produce any breakthrough. We do not see the emergence of any real Russian–American consensus on how we move forward. A lot of press attention will go to Western arming efforts, but that’s slightly misleading because the Saudis have as much money for weapons as America does – Americans are not only ones who can arm the rebels.

All of this is a recipe for a stalemate. I don’t fall into a “the regime is winning” category; it’s more “the regime is no longer losing.” They have showed improvements in capability and strategic vision, and it’s possible they will continue to win strategically important battles.

The latest stats on the death toll in Syria are striking because the single largest [casualty] component is Syrian security forces, even higher than civilian casualties. They’ve lost tens of thousands of military personnel. So it’s not like it’s an easy war for the regime. [But] they have an ability to capitalize on the fragmentation of the opposition. The opposition is in a reactive stage where it pushes a little on all fronts but can’t decide on a strategy framework that works well.

There were rumors about an evacuation for over a week before we withdrew, but at that point we still thought that we could stand a bit more, and that some kind of help from other Syrian cities would come. Some 200 fighters did manage to come, but it wasn’t enough.

On Tuesday [June 4] at noon, I heard that Hezbollah and the regime forces were advancing to the city center. I heard they took Rifiyeh, a huge primary school in the east of the city. Then I heard they advanced towards the national clinic, which was used as a makeshift medical facility. They put snipers on the rooftops in these two areas, which meant that they also covered some parts of downtown. That was when we knew Qusayr was over. There was panic among the residents, and the leaders gathered in the evening and decided to evacuate.

I decided to stay with the FSA [Free Syrian Army] Farouq brigade, not as a fighter but because they had Internet. The best place to stay updated was with an FSA group. I also wanted to make sure I had someone to leave with.

I did not know what the FSA leaders were up to, but I was certain that they would come up with a good plan. I heard that they might hit a checkpoint and clear a way for civilians or make some kind of agreement with Hezbollah or the regime. I heard that they agreed with some Hezbollah leader that we can choose any road we want, and he assured one of the FSA leaders that they wouldn’t shoot or shell any vehicle.

I was a bit skeptical about this, since we killed a lot of them. Then again, why should they worry about us or the FSA after we left Qusayr, since we left all the medium and heavy weapons behind? Some FSA fighters took their rifles with them, but that was it. It became clear on the way, however, that the regime was not going to let us go that easily.

‘You Couldn’t Hear a Pin Drop’

We were the last group to leave at 5am on Wednesday. Before we left I took my camera and videotaped whole town for documentation since this was the last time we would see it before Hezbollah and the regime forces took it. There was nothing. You couldn’t hear a pin drop.

We set off at about 5am and headed towards the village of Dabaa, and then Buwayda and Salhiyeh. All of the FSA groups and some 25,000 civilians had to wait there until the evening. We couldn’t move in the daylight, because if the regime forces or Hezbollah saw us leaving, they would target us. There were some houses, but because of our huge numbers, most of us had to stay in open fields. We waited until sunset on Wednesday and set off towards a tiny narrow hidden road.

We thought that the FSA would attack one of the checkpoints on the road in order to allow us to evacuate, but then we discovered that the FSA was planning for us to flee discreetly. The majority of the people were riding in cars or big vans and lorries, but some were also on foot. But we had only driven for about 15 minutes when they told us that we were going to have to walk.

The FSA was in front of us, coordinating between themselves and sending guides to tell people which way to go. We were not moving all together but split into groups of dozens or hundreds. It was one of the roads they had used to smuggle, but it was very dangerous. We were told there was a very high chance that people might be ambushed and killed, and that we might have to retreat.

We had to cross many roads that were open to snipers and very close to regime checkpoints. Every time we crossed a road near a checkpoint, we were targeted by shelling and snipers. But we were moving fast and no one got hurt. That lasted two or three hours. Then we got to a place called al-Hamra where we had to cross a major highway that connects al-Hamra on the western side to Homs in the east. That was very difficult because we were on foot and people were getting very tired. And we were very close to a checkpoint.

I thought that since we left Qusayr and the FSA left all their weapons and tanks behind them, they would leave us alone. I was shocked to see we were targeted by all kinds of weapons: snipers, rockets, gunfire, shelling … it was horrible. They seized every chance to inflict heavy losses, targeting civilians and wounded people. We were forced to leave many wounded people behind due to the intense shelling. We were forced to leave all the weapons we had won for over two years. We left our houses, which were full of valuable things. We left our fields, our lands. We left everything behind, yet the regime was not satisfied.

We were two meters from an important highway when the regime forces opened fire on us. I was with my three brothers. One of them, Rami, had already been wounded in his leg, and he was using crutches, so we had to move slowly. Then I heard a sound near me – it was my youngest brother Hadi.

Rifaie’s brother Hadi stands alongside a fellow FSA fighter, Hassan Haswa, during better days in Qusayr.

I heard him screaming, “My stomach!” He was just meters away. The moment he got shot he was saying, “Shahada,” [the Muslim profession of faith] very loud. He said, “Don’t cry over me.” I thought it was a minor wound, but then I looked at him and saw the life draining from his eyes. I was with my two other brothers, and when he lost consciousness we didn’t believe it. We were kilometers away from home, in the middle of nowhere. There was shooting everywhere, and despite that we started screaming for medics and nurses. We were panicking along with all the civilians. And it was dense darkness. Then, another brother of mine found a car. We got him inside the car, drove 30 meters, and the driver said, “He’s dead, you can’t help him.” He asked us to just take him out of the car, and we did. But one of my brother’s friends didn’t want to believe it, so we carried him. We covered one kilometer in a half hour, but then we told his friend that it was no use. We dug a small hole and buried my brother. He was just 20.

After we buried Hadi we had to again stay in open fields among trees all day Thursday. When evening came we kept moving till we reached another place. The goal was to move east towards the Damascus suburbs. When we reached that location we had already crossed 20 to 25 kilometers (12-15 miles) on foot. If you look at the map, it seems like it wasn’t that far, but we were zigzagging the whole way.

Then we reached a point where either you make it or you’re going to die: the “death opening.”

Earlier in the day, the U.S. claimed it had evidence that Bashar al-Assad’s regime had used the chemical weapon agent Sarin, a poisonous gas, on a small scale against rebel forces, crossing the “red line” President Barack Obama has said would lead him to intervene.

Here, Syria watchers – and a rebel commander – react to Obama’s decision.

Abu Hussein, 28, a defected FSA lieutenant who fought in Qusayr and recently escaped from Syria to Beirut: 

The U.S. just talks. Hezbollah admitted that they entered the war in Syria with all of their power, and Russia keeps helping the regime with weapons and policy, while for two years the U.S. has said Bashar must leave, but does nothing.

Every day they kill more than 150 Syrians [referring to the U.S. saying the regime killed 150-plus people with Sarin gas]. The regime used chemical weapons months ago. The U.S. did nothing before about it, and we don’t think they will now.

Syrians think that the U.S. and others want this war to stay alive as much as possible. All of the help and aid is just to keep the opposition fighting and not to let the war end. But now things are changing quickly: Hezbollah entered with large numbers, and there is direct support from Iran. The U.S. and others now must do something quickly, or all of Syria will be occupied by Iran and Hezbollah.

Chris Phillips, Syria expert and lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East at the University of London and associate fellow, Chatham House: 

I can understand from a short-term perspective why people think arming the rebels is a good idea: they’ve got the right to defend themselves, the imbalance is huge on the ground, the regime is brutally targeting civilians to instill terror.

From a broader analytical position, I fail to see how arming the rebels will bring about the end of this civil war any quicker. It seems likely to exacerbate tensions and to deter the regime and the rebels from offering to negotiate, because both sides will now think they have to win it. It’ll encourage Iran and Russia to donate more weapons to the regime and seems to fan the flames of conflict. The question is, What is the West’s goal in Syria? What are they trying to do? End the civil war? Topple the Assad regime? Prevent the state from collapsing? Ideally, they want to do all these things, but they are not willing to put in the level of resources that their rivals are. Iran and Russia are far more committed to this than the U.S, Britain and France. So they are unlikely to achieve these goals.

Within the political community, there’s a feeling of, “You’ve got to put money where your mouth is, Obama. You’ve got to act.” In the sheer length of time it has taken to respond to [questions about U.S. intervention], he’s been losing his credibility as a leader both internationally and domestically. The great irony of this [lifting of the E.U.'s embargo of weapons to Syrian rebels] was that it was a stalking horse for the U.S. [The E.U.] never would have done it without [the support of] the U.S. And that move itself changed dynamics on the ground, because Russia immediately responded by saying they’re going to send a large number of anti-aircraft missiles [to Syria]. It also caused the [Syrian army's] attack on Qusayr to step up at that point, and the regime’s gains on the ground then seemed correlated to this move to arm the rebels.

Obama knows full well he cannot do a no-fly zone by half. If they set up a no-fly zone, given the level of air [power] that the regime has, a no-fly zone is something you have to maintain for an indefinite period of time, and there’s a chance that would mean high casualties. We can’t just start with a no-fly zone; you first have to get more involved with fighting on one side of the civil war, which Obama doesn’t want. We’ll see [the U.S. give the rebels] small arms and maybe anti-tank weapons. The U.S. is very reluctant, because if they end up in the wrong hands, they’ll be very dangerous.

Volker Perthes, director of the Berlin-based German Institute for International and Security Affairs:

Pressure has been building up in the U.S. to do more to back the Syrian opposition. The administration has been thinking about what to do to help the opposition regain some balance without involving the U.S. too deeply, particularly with [Secretary of State John] Kerry trying to get a meaningful diplomatic process [Geneva II] and knowing that this won’t happen unless there is some balance between the warring parties.

Obama certainly doesn’t want to involve U.S. troops in another Middle East war. However, he can also not afford to have Hezbollah and Iran win in Syria. Thus, he has made the decision to arm the Syrian opposition. Not to an extent to make them able to go for military victory, but in order to make them strong enough to forge a political process and meaningful negotiations on a transitional government in Geneva – which probably won’t happen so soon.

Aram Nerguizian, analyst at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies:

The wording of the administration’s press statement on so-called Syrian chemical weapons “red lines” seems to point to a rationale for officially talking military aid while going into the G8. Obviously this is something that Russia will strongly object to and view as the U.S. back-tracking on preferences tied to a diplomatic process. From a regional standpoint (i.e. in the eyes of local forces in and around Syria), the announcement will be perceived as having less to do with any regime use of chemical weapons and more to do with recent regime and allied successes against the armed opposition. The West may be uncertain about what opposition victory may even mean anymore, but it is still focused on preventing a regime victory.

It is still unclear what sorts of weapons the administration will elect to provide. It is unlikely that the U.S. will provide truly qualitative or “game-changing” weapons systems. There is also very little clarity on the scope of such aid. What is clear, however, is that this decision will likely embolden rather than intimidate Assad and his allies. If mismanaged, it could also influence the choices of other external actors like Russia and Iran. As both external camps seek to secure their preferred outcome, it is more likely to lead to more escalation and death in Syria, rather than any meaningful resolution of the conflict, or its underlying socioeconomic and political causes.

Hezbollah’s invasion of Syria over the past few months, ostensibly to fight against Sunni extremists from Al Qaeda, has essentially transformed Syria’s conflict into a regional sectarian war.

But another story has been brewing. Far from the border town of Qusayr, which was captured earlier this month by Hezbollah and fighters loyal to Syrian president Bashar al Assad, the regime apparently went on a recruiting drive in the Shiite villages north of Aleppo.

A leaked YouTube video [[below]] (viewed more than 200,000 times in the past week) showed a town hall meeting led by General Mohammed Khaddour, reportedly the top commander of the Syrian Army in Aleppo. Khaddour was flanked by a Baath party official and by Waheed Akkad, Aleppo’s governor. He proceeded to explain his plan to steer local militias from Nubl and Zahraa, two Shiite villages in Aleppo, into the umbrella Syrian Army corps.

Against a backdrop of sectarian Shiite chants, Khaddour said that the army needed experienced fighters from the towns in order to break through the Free Syrian Army’s siege of Minnigh airport, which is the last (and therefore crucial) Assad base in the region north of Aleppo.

“We will raise the flag of Hussein in Minnigh and fight under his banner,” Khaddour said, referring to the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson (who is revered by Shiite Muslims).

Khaddour offered permanent government jobs to the men who joined the campaign on Minnigh, and promised to resolve any pending problems that residents of the town might have with the embattled central government. “Nubl and Zahraa will become the capital of rural Aleppo,” he said, to loud cheers.

The general also promised the people of Nubl and Zahraa that they could keep some of the tanks and ammunition recovered from Minnigh, essentially giving the villagers a stake in the spoils wrought by his army.

But there were men in the crowd who weren’t taken by the rhetoric. They challenged the general with questions and comments.

Khaddour said he would bring 250 soldiers to the battle and wanted to augment those forces with civilians from Nubl and Zahraa. He asked local militia commanders to gather 50 or 100 men per unit.

At that point, an unidentified man challenged him, saying the local commanders weren’t experienced officers — they were mere carpenters, drivers and day laborers. Khaddour responded that each group of amateurs would be led by a military officer or commander from the so-called National Defense Army, the name for the re-branded Shabiha paramilitary.

Another man immediately shouted that the ragtag National Defense couldn’t be considered a military organization.

The Nubl recruitment drive, and the Syrian Army’s alleged reliance on foreign fighters from Iraq, Lebanon and Iran, suggest that the Syrian Army’s traditional reserves have been depleted, though it’s unknown the exact number of defections.

*

Insofar as a regional war is flaring up among Sunnis and Shiites, and Qusayr was a major salvo.

In Qusayr, five miles north of the Syrian-Lebanese border and midway between Homs and Lebanon, sectarian tensions erupted last week as the battle for supremacy ended with a victory for Hezbollah and the Assad regime. Hezbollah fighters declared the predominately Sunni city, which has now largely been destroyed, as Shiite. They raised a banner for Hussein in the main square.

Many Syrians, and Arabs, expressed a sense of betrayal by Hezbollah, which had widespread support in the Arab world for its years of resistance against Israel. One image that went viral shows the people of Qusayr providing free food and welcoming Shiite refugees from Lebanon who fled after Israel invaded in 2006, compared to Hezbollah supporters in southern Lebanon passing out sweets to celebrate the victory in Qusayr in 2013. The banner in Lebanon read “Qusayr has fallen,” while the sign in Qusayr in 2006 said: “Our Lebanese brothers, you are among family.”

Volker Perthes, director of the Berlin-based German Institute for International and Security Affairs:

The lifting of the embargo will certainly not change things on the ground in the short run. What is more important is what is going to be decided in Washington this week, where discussions will be held about whether to supply lethal equipment to the Free Syrian Army (FSA) or take other, more active measures to bring some balance to the situation on the ground in Syria.

Those who wanted the embargo to be lifted have not yet decided whether they want to supply arms yet; they have not identified the groups they would supply them to; and there is a time frame before deliveries would happen. We wouldn’t see any move by France or Britain before August, which gives them time to figure out the political consequences of delivering arms. Other countries made it clear they would not supply arms, but would also not stand in the way.

The lack of unity in the (Syrian) political opposition is a problem, but not a decisive obstacle. If Britain and France or the US decides to send arms, they will try to identify responsible groups within the rebellion and probably not go through the National Coalition.

The agreement among European countries was that it is necessary to create a certain balance between the regime in Damascus and the opposition, and there are different ways to reach that. Arms can be one way to reach a balance in the military struggle, but you can also help create a balance by supporting the reconstruction of rebel-held areas; by supplying medical and humanitarian supplies; and by helping administrations in rebel areas pay salaries.

The general assumption is that Damascus will not negotiate unless there is a certain balance between the parties. It is not unusual in a civil war situation to have international actors sponsor negotiations where the two sides meet in parallel with fighting on the ground. It would be good to put a political logic back in the struggle and not give the impression that decisions can only be reached by military solutions or supremacy in the end.

Nikolaos van Dam, former Dutch ambassador to Iraq and Egypt, and author of “The Struggle for Power in Syria”:

The EU has had ambivalent policy towards Syria from day one. They said that the regime was illegitimate, but they did not contribute to a solution to the conflict. They are still in that stage – not contributing to end conflict but also squabbling over whether or not to send arms. They are supporting the idea of Geneva II on one hand, but if they arm the opposition at the same time, it is contrary to encouraging any negotiations. The British and French really want to send arms. The others will try to convince them that this will prolong the conflict and even make it bloodier.

Whether it will make a difference on the ground depends on what weapons they are going to send and how many. But even if they do send a lot of anti-aircraft weapons, the fighting on the ground will continue. The EU would need other countries to send them through: Turkey, Jordan or Lebanon. Turkey would be the easiest, but perhaps even the Turks are getting cold feet.

Lifting the embargo will not make much difference on the ground militarily speaking, but it will make a difference in the political context. For the opposition, the idea that they will get arms from some EU countries after all means they will be even less inclined to have any political negotiations with the regime.

The US has shifted its policy from not supporting negotiations to agreeing with the Russians to have a peace conference without the precondition that the regime would disappear. The EU officially supports Geneva II, but in the back of their minds they believe the regime must go.

Barah Mikail, Middle East expert at the Madrid-based think tank FRIDE:

Not much has changed from before. France and the UK are still pushing to send arms to Syria while the other 25 member states consider it too dangerous. The division among the political opposition is one of the main concerns for EU member states. If they support the armed opposition, they could end up in an Afghanistan scenario with their weapons turning against them. Dealing with part of the opposition also could have the effect of radicalizing and pushing away the others.

Every EU member state has the freedom to organize what it wants. I would not prevent France and the UK from giving weapons, or facilitate their traffic in order to strengthen the opposition. We have already heard about France and the UK delivering weapons to some armed opponents, and rumors have developed that Spain is allowing some traffic to pass through.

French Prime Minister Laurent Fabius spoke recently about evidence of chemical weapons being used, and I would say it was in order to push EU member states to strengthen the armed opposition. He was also expressing a concern that the situation on the ground was turning to the advantage of the regime. Countries like France and the UK want to support the armed opponents to avoid more defeats.

A month ago, everyone was betting that the Syrian regime would not negotiate with its opponents, and the contrary happened. The regime said they were ready to attend Geneva II, and the opponents said they do not want to negotiate with this regime. Even if it does happen, I don’t see what kind of agreements the sides could reach. The red lines on one side are far from the red lines on the other. As long as the regime is strong on the ground, and the opposition sets the condition of Bashar al-Assad leaving, then it won’t succeed. It is like saying to the regime, we want to kill you, and we want to discuss how we will kill you. I’d say it is better for Geneva II not to happen. It could even deepen the tensions between both sides and widen the gap that exists between the opposition groups.